This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a non-monotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, mandatory capital ratios may also result in pro-cyclicality of bank lending even if banks make use of the standard approach.
Introduction
In 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a proposal for a new capital adequacy agreement (Basel II), which shall displace the existing agreement presumably by 2006. While improving risk weighting, the Basel Committee is anxious to keep the capital requirement associated with an average risky portfolio more or less unchanged. This concern has been caused partly by observations that capital-to-asset ratios increased considerably in the aftermath of the launch of the first Basel accord (Jackson, 1999) .
The European Central Bank (2003) presents such evidence for a number of European banks; similar results are also reported for Switzerland (Rime, 2001 ), Spain (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004) and for the U.S. (Flannery and Rangan, 2004, and Jakivuolle, 2004) . At first sight, one possible reason for building-up such capital cushions might be the exceptional rise in the stock markets during the period under consideration.
1 At this time, banks were clearly in a comfortable position to raise new funds by issuing shares and the rise in the stock market also indicates that banks were able to reinvest earnings considerably. As capital cushions would then merely exist accidentally, it has also been argued that those cushions may emerge as a systemic result of the dynamic management of a bank's portfolio. In general, profit maximizing banks trade off costs of approaching or falling below the minimum requirement with those associated with raising capital up-front or with recapitalization when the requirement is violated. For example, Furfine (2000) argues that these costs might come in form of intensified supervisory review, a weakened reputation or immediacy of the need to restore the capital position either by cutting lending or trying to obtain new external capital. customers, the latter may react such that the bank is forced to hold capital cushions in order to provide its customers with services required by them.
Considering liquidity provision as the major function a bank, this paper aims to provide a rationale for holding a capital cushion in line with the existing functional approach to banking.
The starting point of our analysis is Diamond and Rajan (2001) . In their setting depository institutions (banks) exist as liquidity creators in a world of incomplete financial contracts. They consider a banker as a relationship lender endowed with specific skills. These skills allow her to enhance the ability of a borrower to commit himself to fulfill loan obligations even if his ultimate lenders are in need of funds at short notice. The banker can do so because she knows at best how to extract payments from the project's assets without employing the borrower's specific skills. Therefore, a borrower's threat to withdraw his specific knowledge from the project once the invest-ment is placed looses bite and he can credibly commit to pay out a larger share of his return to his lender if he is bound to a banker.
On the other hand, by construction of the demand deposit contract, a banker can credibly commit herself not to hold up her financiers since any attempt to hold up depositors results in a bank run. Owing to this special characteristic of a deposit contract, deposits strictly dominate bank capital as long as project returns are certain (Diamond and Rajan, 2000) . While this approach explains liquidity provision by banks, there is no reason why a bank should exceed regulatory capital requirements once they are introduced. The reason is that a banker facing a binding regulatory capital-to-asset ratio can extract more rents, which in turn always reduces the amount she can pledge to her financiers. To close this gap we show in this paper that the amount a banker can pledge to ultimate financiers may also depend on her capital structure in a non-monotonic way.
This result arises when renegotiations are risky and the banker is risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In our setting, capital does not serve as a buffer against shocks to project returns but as a strategic tool for renegotiations with borrowers. When the capital-to-asset ratio exceeds some critical value, the banker can share her risk of a renegotiation breakdown with her shareholders to an increasing degree, making her less reluctant to assume the risk of a renegotiation breakdown. As this improves her bargaining position, she is able to extract even higher payments from her borrower. On the other hand, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000) , an increasing capital-to-asset ratio also improves her ability to extract rents at the expense of equity claimants. Hence, whether payments, which can credibly be pledged to ultimate financiers, are increasing or not depends on a tradeoff between enhancing the bankers ability to extract payments from borrowers and capturing rents.
The argument that the capital structure can be used as a strategic tool in negotiations with a third party is not novel. For example, Perotti and Spier (1993) suggest that an entrepreneur makes use of senior debt claims as a bargaining tool to extort his contracting party. However, Perotti and Spier focus on the strategic relationship between shareholders and labor unions and
show how an entrepreneur can use debt-for-equity exchanges to extract wage concessions from his employees; they do not apply this idea to a banker whose economically valuable function is liquidity creation. Moreover, they argue by means of the Nash-bargaining solution to renegotiations assuming that utility over the set of possible bargaining outcomes is convex, which leaves open why the players' attitudes towards risk may matter for renegotiations. In this paper, instead, we utilize a non-cooperative game structure with stochastic bargaining costs to provide a microeconomic rationale for that risk aversion may matter.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the determinants of a bank's capital structure and asks how the amount of funds the bank can raise from her financiers depends on her capital structure. Section 3 focuses on the consequences of binding minimum capital adequacy ratios for bank lending. Section 4 discusses some policy implications. Section 5 summarizes the results.
2 Determinants of a bank's capital structure 2.1 Financial contracts with the risk of renegotiation break down
In a first step, we show in a non-cooperative game setting how, in general, the bargaining solution of renegotiations depends on the parties' attitudes towards risk. Following Hart and Moore (1994) we consider a financial relationship between an entrepreneur and a lender (not necessarily a bank yet).
The entrepreneur runs a firm and possesses a project idea but is endowed with no own funds. His external financial needs are, thus, identical with the size I of the investment project.
3
The project lasts for one period or two dates T = 0, 1 respectively. The project requires an initial investment of I at T = 0 and yields a non-verifiable cash flow of Y > I at T = 1 if the entrepreneur contributes his specific skills.
The physical assets created in the course of the initial investment may also have a value without the entrepreneur's specific skills. This second best alternative use is referred to as liquidation and has a verifiable return of L ∈ (0, I) at T = 1.
As in Hart and Moore (1994) and Rajan (2000, 2001) we assume that the entrepreneur cannot commit to contributing his specific skills to the project in the remote future but only for a short period of time. Hence, once the investment is placed, the entrepreneur might initiate renegotiations shortly before the project matures in order to beat down loan repayments by threatening to withdraw his specific skills. Only if both parties reach an agreement the entrepreneur will actually contribute his specific skills and the project turns out to be successful.
The renegotiation game in extensive form is assumed to have the following general structure (Rubinstein, 1982) : If the entrepreneur refuses to fulfil his originally given debt obligation H ≥ I, both parties meet to start a first bargaining round. In this first round, the entrepreneur offers an alternative repayment P which can be either accepted or rejected by the lender. If the latter rejects P she makes a counteroffer R in the second round. When the entrepreneur rejects this counteroffer R, an independent arbitrator fixes a repayment X ∈ (L, Y ), which is known to both parties at the beginning of renegotiations.
In extension to this general structure of the Rubinstein game it is reasonable to suppose that the bargaining outcome is not certain. Firstly, the parties' threat points may be uncertain. For example, the lender does not know the liquidation value of assets precisely when entering into renegotiations. Secondly, an arbitrator's decision cannot be anticipated definitely because there are some unforeseeable events driving his decision and parties cannot exert influence on these events. Finally, renegotiations may also be associated with bargaining costs. In each bargaining round parties may be forced to bear these costs in order to continue and advance the bargaining process. These costs, containing expenses for legal assistance and expertises, are typically not known for sure by the parties at the beginning of renegotiations. Then there is a risk that these costs become as large as it is not worthwhile for one party or the other to carry renegotiations forward.
There are many reasons why renegotiations are risky and may even breakdown because of some exogenous events. The following specification of the bargaining process operationalizes the general idea of risky bargaining in a stylized but tractable way. Several other ways are conceivable without changing the main implications. We suppose that, if the lender rejects the first offer P made by the entrepreneur, she applies for an insolvency proceeding at a court of justice. Since project returns Y are non-verifiable by courts at this early stage of the hearing, the court may decide to dissmiss this application with probability (1 − p) because it expects that bankruptcy assets lack to cover the costs of the legal procedure. In this case, the lender seizes the real assets. On the other hand, with probability p ∈ (0, 1), the court opens the insolvency proceeding and allows the lender to make a counteroffer R (see figure 1 ).
- Figure 1 about hereIn this second round the entrepreneur decides whether or not to accept R. While deciding on accepting R the entrepreneur has to take into account that, with probability q ∈ (0, 1), the court has learned that the project's conjectural value isȲ ∈ (L, Y ). Maybe, this conjectural valueȲ is Y net of legal charges: Suppose the judge comes to know the true value Y of the project with probability q; having subtracted the court costs a total ofȲ remains to be shared between the lender and the entrepreneur. Hence, with probability q the judge will convict the entrepreneur to pay out an amount X to the lender, which is at most the original repayment obligation H (maybe plus a fine) orȲ , i.e. X = min H,Ȳ . On the other hand, with probability
(1 − q), the court has no additional valuable information on the project's value and, hence, allows the lender to liquidate the entrepreneur's assets.
By backward induction, the entrepreneur accepts the lender's counteroffer R in round 2 if
where U denotes the entrepreneur's von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index.
Thus, the lender will offer R such that the entrepreneur is just indifferent to accept, i.e. R equals the certainty equivalent of a lottery
By inspecting (1) we obtain R ∈ min H,Ȳ , Y > L.
In the first bargaining round the lender accepts the entrepreneur's original offer P if
where V denotes the lender's von Neumann/Morgenstern utility index. Accordingly, the entrepreneur sets P equal to the lender's certainty equivalent of a lottery
It follows P ∈ (L, Y ) irrespectively whether H >Ȳ or not.
Consequently, whenever P < H the entrepreneur will certainly refuse to meet his repayment obligation at T = 1 and the lender is, thus, not willing to conclude a financial contract at T = 0 because loan repayments do not cover the opportunity costs of the provided funds.
The subgame perfect equilibrium solution P depends on the liquidation value L, the project's cash flow Y and its verifiable partȲ , and the probabilities p and q, as well as on the respective attitudes towards risks of both parties: On the one hand, a more risk averse entrepreneur both accepts a higher payment R in the second round and offers a higher payment P in the first round than a less risk averse entrepreneur. On the other hand, the repayment the lender is just willing to accept in the first round will be smaller the more risk averse she behaves.
So far, we have considered the renegotiation process between the entrepreneur and a lender, given that there is a risk of breakdown in renegotiations.
Next we turn to the specific role of demandable deposits, which are offered by a bank.
Bank finance by demandable deposits
Assume that liquidation of the physical assets requires specific liquidation skills. Acquiring these skills is a time and effort consuming business so that the lender bears some (non-monetary) disutility. To economize on these costs it is optimal to mandate a single banker to acquire these liquidation skills, who acts on behalf of all financiers in financial contracting with the entrepreneur. Without loss of generality, these costs are normalized to zero.
The banker is assumed to possess no own financial wealth. Instead, to grant a loan to the entrepreneur, she has to raise money from financiers.
This generates an overlapping hold-up problem since not only the entrepreneur may refuse to meet his loan obligations but the banker may also want to renegotiate her obligations owed to financiers. She can do so because, while accompanying the project from its very first stage, she is the only one who develops specific skills in identifying how to bring out the best liquidation value of the project, whereas anyone else yields much lower liquidation proceeds. Hence, the banker may threaten not to utilize her skills unless obligations are renegotiated.
If, however, the banker takes money from financiers by means of a deposit contract, the hold-up problem between the banker and the financiers vanishes. Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that the deposit contract creates a collective action problem among depositors making any attempt of the banker to renegotiate deposits to result in a bank run and total disintermediation. This disintermediation disables the banker to cover her initial costs of acquiring liquidation skills. Thus, she is not inclined to renegotiate demandable deposits unless it is absolutely necessary. By issuing demandable deposits, the banker is able to attract sufficient funds if repayments pledgeable by the entrepreneur covers at least investment expenses.
Mixed bank finance
So far, we have assumed that the bank completely finances her assets by demand deposits. Now, we consider the case when the banker uses a mixed capital structure and chooses a capital-to-asset ratio k, i.e. the share of equity E in total funds raised from financiers. To simplify matters, suppose that the banker and equity shareholders equally share the loan repayments from the entrepreneur net of deposits owed to depositors. 4 Then, the capital ratio is given by
implying
Hence, for a given capital-to-asset ratio renegotiation proof payment P satisfies:
and we obtain Lemma 1 If the banker exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the maximum pledgeable loan repayment P is decreasing in k for low k but increasing in k for high k.
Proof. See Appendix.
The interpretation of lemma 1, part 1, is as follows: If renegotiations with the borrower fail, the banker can share the risk of this renegotiations breakdown with shareholders. If, on the other hand, renegotiations succeed, the loan repayments collected by the banker (net of deposit repayments) are divided equally between shareholders and the banker. Hence, the banker's risk burdens are less meaningful for a higher capital ratio if she exhibits decreasing attitudes towards risk. This, in turn, strengthens her bargaining position vis-à-vis borrowers.
action per se. Instead, the board of directors and the shareholders bargain over dividends in the course of a shareholders' meeting.
Part 2 of lemma 1 deals with the situation that the capital-to-asset ratio k is low such that the banker gets nothing if renegotiations break down (because everything she collects from liquidation is forwarded to depositors).
Then, the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are a decreasing function of k if the banker behaves risk avers. The reason for this is that a variation in k does not affect the banker's net income position in case of a renegotiations breakdown but only if renegotiations succeed. But a risk averse banker is less willing to accept a higher risk of a renegotiation breakdown, i.e. the certainty equivalent of the lottery does not increase proportionally and therefore P decreases. To put it the other way round, maximum pledgable loan repayments increase if the capital ratio decreases and reach a local maximum at k = 0,
i.e. if the banker completely refinances herself by deposit contracts.
We further conclude:
Lemma 2 Pledgeable loan repayments P are maximized if the bank chooses a capital structure given by k * = 0.
Since the loan repayment P = π(k, L) is divided up between depositors, shareholders and the banker, these three parties receive the following amounts:
• The depositors:
• the suppliers of equity finance:
• the banker:
Hence, the maximum amount of funds the banker can attract for a given capital ratio is
. Since
the amount of funds a banker can raise depends on the capital ratio in a nontrivial matter: At first, if k <k, for which we have dπ(k, L)/dk < 0, it follows unambiguously dZ/dk < 0. However, if k >k we have dπ(k, L)/dk > 0 and the sign of dZ/dk is a priori not clear. Two effects work in opposite directions:
A risk sharing effect and a holdup effect. By the former an increase in k increases P , i.e. the risk sharing effect improves the ability of the banker to raise funds. But an increase in k also leads to a rise in the rent the banker can extract from renegotiations with shareholders (holdup effect) because of:
Lemma 3 The rent of the banker is monotonically increasing in k.
3 Bank competition and the effects of minimum capital adequacy ratios 
Proof. The proof follows directly from lemmata 1 to 3.
The intuition behind the first result is that a banker, who extracts the largest rent at the expense of her contracting partners, chooses a capitalto-asset ratio k * that maximizes that rent provided that it still allows her to raise funds just sufficient to finance the investment project. Further, if a regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is imposed it does either not matter or leads to total disintermediation depending on how large the required ratio is. Disintermediation comes into effect when the required ratio exceeds the maximum capital-to-asset ratio that just allows the banker to raise sufficient funds for investment finance.
Positive rents, however, attract new bankers into the marktet and banking competition will melt down a banker's rents to zero. Since the capital-to-asset ratio k is the only instrument variable, in a competitive equilibrium without regulatory requirements every banker chooses k = 0, i.e. competition force them to forward the maximum pledgeable loan repayments to their respective depositors. This competitive equlibrium, however, is not independent from banking regulation, and imposing a minimum capital adequacy ratio may have an impact on the banker's choice of k in a way that is not intended by the regulator.
Proposition 2 In a competitive banking industry the banker chooses a capital-to-asset ratio k * = 0 if there is no minimum capital adequacy ratio.
However, in the presence of a capital adequacy requirement k reg 1. the banker will choose
there is disintermediation otherwise.
Proof. Again, the proof follows from lemmata 1 to 3.
Part 1 of the proposition says that the banker chooses the minimum out of a set of capital-to-asset ratios that both meet the regulatory requirement and enables her to credibly commit to pay out financiers at least the invested amount I. This formulation includes the case where the banker just meets the regulatory requirement if and only if π(k reg , L)/(1 + k reg ) ≥ I.
But it also includes that the banker may choose even a larger k * satisfying
e. the actual capital-toasset ratio is in excess of the required minimum ratio. She will do so because satisfying the requirement with equality leads to an insufficient amount she can credibly commit to repay. However, increasing her capital-to-asset ratio allows her to collect even more from her borrower and thereby to repay at least I to the ultimate financiers. If either condition cannot be met there will be disintermediation.
To illustrate our main results we use the following example:
Then, the shapes of the resulting P and Z curves are given as presented in figures 2 and 3 (please note the different scaling of the y-axis). Suppose the mandatory capital requirement is k = 0.08. Then, figure 3 allows to separate three cases which differ in the size I of the investment project the banker has to finance:
• If I = 764 a monopolist banker chooses k * ≈ 11.2 % given by the intercept of the Z-curve and the lowest horizontal line in figure 3 irrespective whether there are regulatory capital requirements or not. Under competition, however, the banker's chooses an k equal to the mandatory capital requirement instead of k = 0 and, therefore, extracts some rents.
• If I = 767 a monopolist banker chooses k * ≈ 10.3 % given by the rightmost intercept of the Z-curve and the middle horizontal line again irrespective whether there are regulatory capital requirements or not. Under competition, she chooses the smallest k for which she is just able to repay I, i.e. k ≈ 8.1 % which (slightly) exceeds the regulatory requirement.
• If I = 770, the banker is not able to fulfil the capital requirement and the project cannot be financed because financiers are not willing to supply an amount of funds which equals the size of the investment. In this case, minimum adequacy ratios lead to disintermediation irrespective whether there is competition or not in the banking industry.
- Figure 
Policy implications
Our considerations also allow to lend some additional support for the cyclicality hypothesis expressed by academics, practitioners as well as policy makers. 5 According to this hypothesis, Basel II capital standards will exacerbate business cycle fluctuations because borrowers may be downgraded under Basel II in the course of an economic downturn. In response, this forces a bank to hold more capital against her current loan portfolio and to curtail lending, thereby amplifying macroeconomic distortions.
Criticism of that procyclicality hypothesis basically rest on two arguments calling its main assumptions into question. Firstly, it is at least arguable whether credit risks really worsen in the course of an economic downturn (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004) . Taking changes in credit risk as a change in the probability density function associated with future credit earnings, it is not clear why risk changes, and if it changes whether it actually does so in that predicted direction. It is also conceivable, instead, that banks simply assume high risks in a boom which then materializes in the following downturn. In that sense, risk-sensitive capital-to-asset ratios may effectively work counter-cyclical. Secondly, even when risk-sensitivity forces banks to hold more capital against their loans, banks may be able to maintain lending in a recession if they hold sufficient capital cushions (Borio et al., 2001 , Lowe, 2002 ).
Since the model presented here is partial and static in its nature one has to be cautious to translate its results into the dynamics and complexity of business cycles. Particularly, in contemporary business cycle theory both banks and firms are supposed to decide on the basis of rational expectations regarding changes in fundamentals. On the other hand, future interest rates, cashflows, and liquidation proceeds do not only have an impact on the described bargaining outcome. Instead, in a general equilibrium both the bargaining outcome and the fundamentals are endogenous variables evolving interdependently.
In spite of this, the argument in this paper may imply that the mere existence of a positive capital cushion does not prevent an economy from procyclicality in bank lending -even if regulatory capital-to-asset ratios are not risk-sensitive. This means that pro-cyclicality should already be a problem with the existing first Basel accord. And, more importantly, when this holds true the same pattern could be expected under the Basel II framework even for banks to which the standardized approach is applied to, i.e. mainly small banks. The reason is that, on the one hand, banks need their capital buffers to raise sufficient funds from investors and that, on the other hand, these optimum capital buffers are counter-cyclical. This view may help to explain why a counter-cyclicality in capital cushions can actually already be detected in existing data, i.e. for the time when the first Basel accord has been effective (Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina, 2004) .
To figure out the responses of capital holdings to business cycles, we ask what happens to a banker's maximum pledgeable payments Z if the liquidation value L falls, a phenomenon that is typically related to economic downturns. Since a fall of L weakens a banker's bargaining position vis-á-vis her borrower, the entrepreneur's maximum pledgeable payments fall. This leads to a decrease in Z, i.e. the amount a banker can credibly commit to pay to her investors. When the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is binding, a banker can (if at all) re-strengthen her bargaining position vis-á-vis her borrower only by choosing an even higher capital-to-asset ratio because this makes her less reluctant to engage in risky renegotiations. As a result, there will be either disintermediation or an increase in the capital cushion.
These considerations yield in:
Proposition 3 In a competitive banking industry and in the presence of a capital adequacy requirement, a decrease in the liquidation value of assets tō L < L results in 1. an unchanged capital-to-asset ratio
2. an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio
This result can be further clearified by means of our previous example.
Example 2 (cont.) Suppose that collateral damages such that L decreases to 700. Then, figure 4 illustrates the effects of capital requirements for a competitive banking industry.
• If I = 764 the banker's chooses an k * = 8.5 which is higher than in the benchmark case.
• If I = 767 the banker cannot provide funds because of binding capital requirements even though she could for L = 705.
• If I = 770 the project cannot get funds either.
- Figure 4 about here -
Concluding remarks
Our aim has been to show that the bargaining position of the banker vis-a-vis her borrowers depends on her capital structure. This effect arises because the capital structure affects the banker's ability to commit herself to a harsh treatment of entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs default on their debt her willingness to make concessions depends on how risks associated with bargaining can be shared with financiers.
The main results of our analysis are as follows: If the bank possesses some monopoly power she will choose an equity ratio that maximizes her rents given that the project can just be financed. This choice is unaffected by regulatory standards as long as these standards are not too strong which leads to disintermediation. Under competition, however, a banker chooses k = 0 and forwards maximum pledgable loan repayments to her depositors as long as there are no minimum adequacy ratios. If, on the other hand, regulators have chosen mandatory capital adequacy ratio above a certain level, bankers are either forced to hold an even higher capital ratio or to drop out of the market.
The results depend on two key assumptions: decreasing risk aversion and risky bargaining. Although we have applied a highly stylized structure of the renegotiation game to introduce the notion of risky bargaining, the implications are even more general. As already mentioned in section 2.1 all we need is to assume that the bargaining outcome cannot precisely be anticipated by contracting parties. Then, attitudes towards risks matter for the reneogotiation-proof contract. And it seems to be plausible to assume that a single agent (banker, entrepreneur) exhibit some degree of risk aversion and that his attitude towards risks depends on his wealth position with a wealthy agent being less reluctant to assume the risk of a given lottery than a poor agent. can commit himself to a harsh treatment of borrowers by refusing to grant a loan in all future dates once the borrower has defaulted. Consequently, any financier can not only extract payments amounting to the net present value of liquidation proceeds but (nearly) all cashflows generated by the borrower.
But then there is no financing problem at all and we find ourselves in a firstbest world where we do not need a bank. Hence, to develop a functional approach to bank behavior we have to assume that such reputational effects do not rule out inefficiencies completely (see Hart, 1995) .
Another possible objection against the incomplete contracts approach to banking offered by Diamond and Rajan (2001) is that depositors may be fully protected by deposit insurance (whether implicitly or explicitly). Deposit insurance is frequently cited as a justification for capital regulation. The argument is that deposit insurance strengthens the incentives for a banker to engage in too risky lending for which minimum capital requirements are a suitable response of the regulator. When, however, a regulator is empowered and committed to close a bank which fails to fulfil a capital requirement one may also argue that the regulator can already close a bank which refuses to pay out depositors even without imposing any capital requirement. The best response of a regulator who wants to insure deposts (for some reason) is not to impose a capital requirement (because this would enable the banker to extract some rents at the expense of her financiers) but to commit himself to a harsh treatment of failing banks. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a fully fledged model of banking regulation taking a wide range of possible reasons for different types of banking regulation into account. Instead the aim of this paper has been to provide an argumentbased on a functional perspective to banking -why banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements.
Proof of Lemma 1.
1. At first, suppose that k is large so that we have
which holds true with strict inequality at least in some neighbourhood to k = 1. Hence, (7) becomes
where the RHS is the expected utility of the lotterỹ
P with probability p
Without loss of generality this lottery can be transformed tô
with probability 1 − p ,
P denotes the common expected value of the lotteriesΓ 1 andΓ 1 . If the utility function V exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the certainty equivalent of the lotteryΓ 1 , given by the amount C at which
holds true, is such that the difference between the expected value W of the lotterie and the corresponding certainty equivalent C is decreasing in W (Mas-Colell; Whinston; Green, 1995, p. 193 ; also see Pratt, 1964) .
Since W itself is an increasing function of the capital ratio k this implies
Note that C is given by
which, for a given P , is increasing in k by P/ (1 + k) 2 . Hence, maximum pledgeable loan repayments P are increasing in the capital ratio k.
2. At second, consider k <k, wherek and the correspondingP satisfy
implying that for all k <k we have max
The lottery the banker faces now is given bȳ
P with probability p W 2 := 0 with probability 1 − p .
Without loss of generality, set V (0) = 0. The maximum pledgeable loan repayment P is thus determined by
for which, by the implicit function theorem, we obtain
where the denominator is strictly positive. Hence, dP/dk < 0 for all concave utility functions V since for all P ≤ R we have
Proof of Lemma 2. Because P is decreasing in k for small k and increasing in k for large k it is sufficient to compare the maximum pledgeable loan repayments at k = 0 and at k = 1. To simplify notations define π(k, L)
as the renegotiation proof payment P associated with k and L according to lemma 1. At k = 0 the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are given by
i.e. we have π(0, L) = R. At k = 1 the maximum pledgeable loan repayments are given by
i.e. we have π(1, L) ∈ (L, R) which is strictly less than R. Hence, π(0, L) > π(1, L).
Proof of Lemma 3. We have to show that
holds. Because of (15), this can for k <k be rewritten as:
where
π(k, L) .
Since numerator in Ω is smaller then the denominator and because k < 1, we have dQ/dk > 0 for k <k. Moreover, since for k ≥k we have dπ(k, L)/dk > 0, it follows that dQ/dk > 0 holds in the whole domain [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that dZ/dL = dπ(k,L)/dL 1+k
. An equivalent condition for the results in the proposition is therefore to show that dπ(k, L)/dL > 0 for high k and dπ(k, L)/dL = 0 for low k.
1. First, suppose that k is large so that 1 2 (L− 1−k 1+k P ) ≥ 0 holds (see lemma 1). Then, P is implicitly defined as a function of L according to
for which the implicit function theorem yields
(Note thatk >k forL < L, wherek is defined as in lemma 1.) In that case we obviously have dP/dL = 0 since the lottery the banker faces if k is low does not depend on L. 
